Abstract-Mobile wireless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), are vulnerable to passive attacks that threaten the privacy of communications. Moreover, threats can now be launched from mobile platforms and with new techniques for eavesdropping, locating, and fingerprinting wireless transmissions. Recently, many wireless anonymous schemes have been studied, and mobility often plays an important role with regard to the effectiveness of wireless anonymity. In this paper, we focus on the impact of node motion behaviors. We first illustrate the emerging anonymity threat of venue privacy attacks (VPAs) to trace mobile wireless nodes. We then propose "motion-MIX" as the countermeasure to defend against the threat. Motion-MIX calls for protection at all the layers of the protocol stack. We further use a new asymptotic security model to verify motion-MIX's effectiveness against VPAs. In a scalable ad hoc network, we prove that the probability of security breach is negligible with respect to the number of network nodes.
Protection Against Mobile Tracing Through
Motion-MIX for Mobile Wireless Nodes connections without support from wired or wireless infrastructure, additional information will be revealed through routing messages, because each node participates in routing operations to maintain a self-organized network (e.g., mobile ad hoc networks, MANETs). The first line of protection is to include anonymizing techniques in both data and routing messages. For example, many anonymous routing schemes have recently been proposed to protect ad hoc networks [1] , [6] , [25] - [27] , [37] , [40] , [41] .
As the wireless medium is open to any device in the transmission range, anonymity concerns and solutions expand to many layers in the protocol stack. Underlying these techniques, mobility plays an important role on how effective they are when wireless eavesdropping techniques, encryption methods, user traffic patterns, and motion patterns can all be different. In addition, the security model of each design can be different, and it is needed to formally measure the effectiveness of a design.
In this paper, we make three contributions, with emphasis on the impact of the node's motion behaviors: First, we study how mobile wireless traffic sensors can trace mobile nodes to obtain their motion and traffic patterns. We illustrate several mobile anonymity attacks that challenge the privacy defense system of an ad hoc network. Second, we propose a new concept of motion-MIX and design principles to protect the mobile nodes. Using a motion-MIX, we create a dynamic geographic area that hides the motion trajectories among multiple nodes moving in and out of the area. Motion-MIX differs from other geographicarea-based mixing concepts [3] in that it is proposed as a countermeasure that requires the efforts of all layers, and its size and location are dynamically determined by the mobility and network settings of both the guarding and adversarial tracing sides. We discuss the necessary conditions in implementing a motion-MIX with dynamic features controlled by mobile guarding nodes and strategies that address many layers in the protocol stack. In particular, we discuss practical strategies based on anonymous routing that ensure packets to be free of any form of network identities to defend against compromised network members and to be (computationally) indistinguishable from random packet transmissions. Third, we introduce "scalable network security," which is an asymptotic network security model, to formally measure the anonymity protection provided in the motion-MIX. In the asymptotic model, security protection can be measured as subpolynomial (i.e., "negligible" in complexity theory [15] ) with regard to an input network metric, such as the number of network nodes. In a large-scale network, the motion-MIX model ensures k-anonymity [38] for all k nodes inside a local MIX area and negligibility of the MIXing failure over polynomially many MIX areas. This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present attacks that are feasible to implement through a mobile traffic sensor network. Section III proposes the concept of "motion-MIX," discusses its differences from other existing models, and shows the necessary conditions to implement a motion-MIX. Section IV presents an analysis to quantify the anonymity protection provided by the motion-MIX design. We review related work in Section V. In addition, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. MOBILE TRACING AND ANONYMITY

A. Concept of Venue
Each network member is identified by a unique network identity (e.g., medium-access control (MAC) address, Internet Protocol (IP) address, or any static pseudonym). The concept of anonymity is defined as the state of being nonidentifiable within an anonymity set of peer nodes [31] . It can be measured by the size of the set or information theoretic metrics [11] , [36] . In mobile networks, a mobile node's location of transmission also demands anonymity protection. In terms of the adversary's positioning capability, we define the concept of venue for the transmission location. A venue is the smallest area to which the adversary can "pinpoint" a node via the node's radio communication. In this paper, we do not consider any identification method other than wireless radio communications (e.g., visual identification) for the purpose of wireless security research.
The size of a venue relates to the effectiveness of wireless localization techniques. For low-cost techniques, it can be an area with a certain size, e.g., the receiving area of an off-theshelf IEEE 802.11 interface may reach a hundred meters or so, depending on the complexity of the terrain. Such an area allows obfuscation within the area. More sophisticated localization techniques, e.g., triangulations using signal-strengthbased distance estimation, or angle of arrival, can be used by the adversary to reduce the area size. Many techniques are able to provide precise location support. However, they could extremely be expensive in cost. They mostly require cooperation from the node being traced and dense deployment of locating devices, e.g., many anchor points within a unit area. These limitations prevent the techniques from being used easily or with low cost by the adversary in a random mobile network. We quantify the obfuscating area, i.e., the venue, with a radius of Δ that is not infinitesimal. Our work intends to localize techniques of practically low cost.
When mapping the venues to vertices in a graph, we can define an undirected graph G = V, E , where all possible venues form a vertex/venue set V , and (multihop) wireless radio links form an edge set E. Likewise, the venue anonymity set comprise all venues, where the sender/recipient venue should not be identifiable within the venue anonymity set, given all intercepted wireless transmissions flowing from a venue to another. Drawing graph G characterizes the capability of a collection of colluding wireless traffic analysts staying in the entire network.
B. Mobile Traffic Sensor Network
Recent advances in manufacturing technologies have enabled the physical realization of small, lightweight, low-power, and low-cost micro air vehicles (MAVs) [23] . These MAVs refer to a new breed of UAVs or aerial robots that are significantly smaller than currently available UAVs. The dimension of MAVs can be as small as 5 in, and the development of insect-size MAVs is expected in the future. MAVs can have fixed, rotary, or flapping wings like insects. These aerial robots, which are equipped with information sensing, radio transmission, and positioning (e.g., Global Positioning System, GPS) capabilities, extend the sphere of awareness and mobility of human beings and allow for surveillance or exploration of environments that are too hazardous or remote for humans. The nextgeneration MAVs to be developed are expected to serve as an enabling technology for a plethora of civilian and military applications, including homeland security, reconnaissance, surveillance, tracking of terrorists/suspects, search and rescue, and highway/street patrol [see Fig. 1(a) ]. Fig. 1(b) shows the MAV system with onboard sensors and ground control station.
C. Mobile Anonymity Attacks
Here, we consider five passive attacking scenarios that can be launched by a set of faster mobile traffic sensors/analysts. 1) Mobile location inference attack: A single mobile adversarial MAV with a less sophisticated radio can infer the positions of a target such as a person's or a car's communication device through its own motion. Fig. 2(a) shows that, with snapshots taken at two different times T 0 and T 1, the adversary can sort nodes into four regions: 1) newcomers; 2) insiders; 3) leavers; and 4) outsiders.
With three adversarial nodes to form a trigroup, they can locate the position with more accuracy. Fig. 2 The network is at least vulnerable to VPA-b and VPA-c attacks. For instance, the adversary can use its own pseudonym system to name each detected distinct node. Then, its VPA-b and VPA-c attacks are unaffected, even though every local node is renamed to another static pseudonym. Intuitively, given arbitrarily x (e.g., x = 100) locally intercepted data packets, the adversary may see the traffic pattern with regard to the 100 packets. Two extreme cases are given as follows: 1) All 100 packets were transmitted from a single node to another single node, and 2) the 100 packets were transmitted from 100 distinct nodes to another 100 distinct nodes. Ideally, an anonymous protocol for mobile networks must ensure that the two extreme cases and all the cases in between are equally likely to the adversary.
III. COUNTERMEASURE
In this section, we describe the concept of motion-MIX and several associated design aspects. We include the design principles for anonymous routing, i.e., identity-free routing and one-time packet content, as necessary conditions to realize motion-MIX. We further discuss the strategies relating to many layers in the protocol stack. These strategies prevent VPAs and mobile tracing attacks.
A. Design Assumption
We assume that the set of nodes that a targeted node hides in, i.e., the anonymity set, is public and finite. For example, if the 32-bit IPv4 address is treated as the identity anonymity set AS id , then the size of the anonymity set |AS id | is at most 2 32 for the entire Internet. Thus, the best case is that a targeted IP address can be any of the 2 32 addresses. The bounded public network area is the venue anonymity set AS venue comprising public and finite amounts of venues.
We assume that mobile nodes can be hijacked and compromised. Once intruded, all the cryptographic materials known by the victim node are revealed to the adversary. Nevertheless, we only assume an honest-but-curious adversary (i.e., it correctly follows protocol but tries to learn as much information as possible from its execution). A dishonest adversary belongs to a different threat model and will be addressed in the future. For intact network members, the adversary is external. The external adversary is a polynomial-bounded cryptanalyst who cannot invert one-way functions or differentiate cryptographically strong pseudorandom bits from truly random bits with nonnegligible probability.
We assume a protocol stack that is similar to the IP protocol stack. An item of interest is a wireless transmission of a linklayer frame. A link-or network-layer payload is encrypted with a per-hop key that is unique for this hop. This requires a pairwise key agreement scheme for any pair of nodes in the network. The transport-layer payload is encrypted with an endto-end session key to protect message privacy. In this paper, we do not study the key agreement problem; we assume a pairwise symmetric key shared between any pair of communicating network nodes. We demand that no node identity is revealed during key agreement. Examples of anonymous key agreements can be found in protocols ANODR [25] and MASK [41] .
B. Motion-MIX
The definition of motion-MIX is based on the venue around each tracing adversarial node (see Fig. 2 ). Because the tracing adversarial nodes are completely passive and covert, it is hard to detect their existence. The guarding side has to assume that the entire network area is divided into an array of venues. However, due to the guarding side's mobility, the actual geographical area is larger than the venue (which is only determined by the adversary's localization capability). Because nodes can roam in and out of the venue within a time δt. Given an average motion speed of v avg and a transmission interval of δt, the motion-MIX is a region with radius Δ , which is larger than or equal to Δ + v avg · δt, as shown in Fig. 3 . It shows that any mobile node that has ever transmitted a packet δt ago and within the distance v avg · δt of the venue could be in the motion-MIX now.
In mobile networks, motion-MIX is used to protect the mobile (transmitting) node's motion pattern. A motion-MIX is a geographical area that can hide the relation among mobile nodes that move in and out of the area. This is shown in Fig. 4 , where the entry and exit points of mobile nodes a i and b j are merely figures of speech. They could be anywhere on the area's border.
The size of a motion-MIX is dynamic and is controlled by both the localization technique and the mobile nodes. Any mobile node can create a larger motion-MIX size of venue when possible. A mobile node can delay its transmissions (increasing δt so that more mobile nodes can roam into the area) or increase its motion speed (through v avg ) to increase the size of the motion-MIX. Given the same venue Δ, a node can create a Δ that is larger than or equal to (Δ + v avg · δt). Here, Δ + v avg · δt represents an average case that can be guessed by an adversary; therefore, it measures the worst case to break motion-MIX protection. This reflects that, when a mobile node being traced actively sends at least a packet every δt, the equal relation holds for the node. When the node sends packets at a lower rate, δt is larger, and the inequality is true. This strategy increases the motion-MIX size. Such strategies are suitable for applications tolerating delay. For example, in delay-tolerant communication [12] , the time interval δt between two consecutive transmissions is enlarged to give more mobile nodes chances to roam into the venue. Obviously, the delay-tolerant communication approach is inapplicable to time-critical applications, such as multimedia streaming. The speed-up approach is inapplicable to stationary sensor networks. Both the delaytolerant and the speed-up approaches incur performance degradation in the time-critical mobile ad hoc routing, where route outage is mainly caused by node inaction and node mobility.
Chaum presented the original notion of message/packet "MIX" [8] . Geographical-area-based mixing concepts have also been studied for location privacy, e.g., "MIX zones" [3] . The "motion-MIX" is different from these mixing-based techniques in three aspects.
1) A motion-MIX is a strict analog of Chaumian MIX by replacing messages with mobile nodes. In Chaum's message MIXing, a message MIX node is a private processor that hides the relation between multiple incoming messages and multiple outgoing messages. A motion-MIX is a private geographic area that hides the relation between multiple incoming nodes and multiple outgoing nodes. The adversary is incapable of seeing the internal state of a single MIX, either Chaumian or motion. Such an analog allows one to extend the venue-based anonymity by reasoning on the venues only. Thus, the difference between message MIX and motion-MIX is that motion-MIX's goal is to hide motion. In addition, a motion-MIX includes design strategies to ensure perfect (identity) anonymity, as discussed in later identity-free schemes of this section. 2) A motion-MIX is defined by "venue," based on the adversary's positioning capability. In addition, the guarding nodes can dynamically create a motion-MIX or enlarge an existing motion-MIX by sending decoy traffic and/or delay-tolerant communication [12] , [22] at any time. Because a guarding node cannot detect a passive attacker nor know the size of venue, it has to assume that attackers are located everywhere with a constant venue size. Thus, it must opt to create a larger motion-MIX all the time by applying the discussed strategies. Thus, a motion-MIX is a dynamic network entity that can be created and changed by both the adversary's behavior and the guarding nodes' actions. In contrast, according to [3] , MIX zones are static "geographic regions" with boundaries where pseudonyms are concerned. The zones are fixed during the network lifetime and do not depend on either the adversary's positioning capability or the guarding nodes' motion behaviors. 3) A motion-MIX protects the entire protocol stack (see the next two sections). In contrast, a MIX zone is defined for middleware systems to protect user identities and linking to locations. The privacy studied in location-based services [28] prevents users from revealing accurate location information to the service providers in a posttransmission way. The originally collected wireless packets can still be traced to a node via the network identities/addresses of the user's mobile device when an adversary comes from the nonservice provider side. For example, unlike motion-MIX (which is related to identity-free ANODR), the network-layer anonymous routing is not a research subject in MIX zone.
C. Strategies Based on Motion-MIX
Motion-MIX has to face the adversary who performs timing and content analyses. As a countermeasure, motion-MIX consists of a set of necessary strategies.
1) Strategies Against Timing Analysis:
Timing analysis correlates the timing instances of messages. In motion-MIX, any mobile node inside a motion-MIX should send out messages to show its existence. When each transmission looks differently, k of them during the system unit time Δt 1 can illustrate at most k nodes within the motion-MIX. In the worst case, when, during unit time Δt, there is only one node sending out one real packet; a necessary condition to ensure k-anonymity is for all nodes (including the node itself) in the motion-MIX venue to send out k − 1 decoy packets in total during the same interval. In this way, a multihop traffic flow from one venue to another remote venue, which is vulnerable to timing analysis, is hidden in the decoy traffic.
The DO 3 IF (I have only heard x < i transmissions so far during the current interval Δt) 4 In the next time slice, transmit a decoy packet with probability (i − x)/i.
END IF 6 END FOR
2) Strategies Against Content Analysis: Content analysis inspects message contents and length. Thus, a motion-MIX should produce indistinguishable messages, even including decoy messages. For a motion-MIX-compliant anonymous protocol, two necessary conditions thus must be satisfied: 1) A mobile node should be indistinguishable from other nodes in the same motion-MIX from the adversary's view. This leads to the identity-free routing design. Otherwise, the (internal) adversary can launch a VPA-a attack to distinguish a node from another by seeing the unique identities. 2) A mobile node's traffic should be indistinguishable from another node's traffic in the same motion-MIX from the adversary's view. This leads to the one-time packet content design. Otherwise, the adversary can distinguish one node's traffic pattern from that of another node.
D. Necessary Conditions
The success of motion-MIX lies on defending against node capture and compromise and external eavesdropping. Defending these adversaries requires necessary conditions for motion-MIX in many aspects, from all the layers at the protocol stack to general principles for routing protocols. Typically, a mobile node sends data packets and routing control packets. For data packets, nodes along the routing path have chances to inspect the header information. For routing messages, possibly all the nodes will process the routing information. Here, we discuss the necessary conditions, first for routing to defend against compromised nodes, then for contents to defeat external traffic analysis, and finally for issues relating to many layers.
1) Identity-Free Routing:
In wireless ad hoc networks, a node must rely on at least one of its neighbors to forward its packets. In normal routing and packet forwarding processes, the mobile node reveals its identity to another node. However, with passive attacks, a sender cannot determine whether a neighbor is compromised or not. In that case, the sending node's identity compromises its anonymity if the receiving node is adversarial. The condition of identity-free routing requests that every mobile node does not reveal its own identity to other nodes.
One solution is to use link identities, instead of senderreceiver identities. In wired Internet, PipeNet [9] and Onion Routing [33] employ an anonymous virtual circuit in routing and data forwarding. Recently, ANODR [25] and MASK [41] apply the same design to wireless ad hoc networks. In these routing schemes, each forwarding node maintains a routing table with two columns of virtual circuit identifiers (VCIs) in the form of "vci x ←→ vci y ." If a node receives a packet and the packet is stamped with a vci x stored in its routing table, the node then accepts the packet, overrides the stamp with the corresponding vci y , and sends the changed packet to the next hop. (The source and the destination are denoted with special VCI tags.) In a nutshell, the virtual-circuit-based data packet forwarding scheme is practical and free of node identities.
The link-layer frame (using the IEEE 802.11 as an example) in an anonymous virtual circuit can reuse the same format but with modified address and payload, e.g., the special MAC address FF : FF : FF : FF : FF : FE for identifying both itself and its receiver for the purpose of anonymous transmissions.
Establishing a virtual circuit on a multihop path requires a signaling procedure to establish the VCI routing tables on all forwarding nodes, and the signaling procedure must be designed to be identity free as well. In existing anonymous virtual circuit schemes, PipeNet, Onion Routing, and MASK are not identity free in their signaling procedure, and ANODR [25] uses a global trapdoor design in its signaling process to serve the identity-free need.
Nevertheless, identity-free routing only prevents a local internal attacker from launching VPA-a. As will be described here, the requirement of one-time packet content is needed to thwart VPA-b and VPA-c.
2) One-Time Packet Content:
In one-time packet content design, packet contents (particularly data packet contents) are computationally one time. In other words, any two transmissions X → Y and X → Y (i.e., the packet sender's pseudonym is X or X , and the packet recipient's pseudonym is Y or Y ) are independent in the eyes of any node who is not X, X , Y , or Y . Because two randomly generated messages are independent by definition, the one-time packet content design is feasible if the adversary cannot differentiate the two transmissions X → Y and X → Y from two truly random transmissions.
Using cryptographically strong pseudorandom bits in an anonymous virtual circuit, two communicating neighboring nodes v a and v b should use their agreed key material K ab to generate cryptographically strong pseudorandom bits to protect their packet contents. In packet forwarding and routing, this means that every field in a link-layer frame must satisfy one of the following conditions: 1) The field is the same for all frames (e.g., the field FF : FF : FF : FF : FF : FE for MAC addresses).
2) The field itself is a cryptographically strong pseudorandom bitstring.
3) The field is XOR-ed with a cryptographically strong pseudorandom bitstring. 4) In decoy frames, cryptographically strong pseudorandom bits are replaced by truly random bits. For any third party who is neither v a nor v b , it does not know the secret seed/key and thus sees bits that are indistinguishable from truly random bits. Therefore, for every uncompromised pairwise key/secret, the adversary sees that every packet transmission protected by the key/secret is indistinguishable from random traffic.
The adversary can always trace a packet flow if the packets in the flow are recognizable with unique bit streams. With this one-time packet content design principle, when there are multiple packet flows going through a motion-MIX, they are MIXed together (see Fig. 4 ).
3) Protocol Stack Issues: In the protocol stack, a transportlayer packet is the payload at the network layer encrypted with an end-to-end key. Related anonymity attacks and counterattacks only involve the two ends. The related end-to-end anonymity protection includes anonymous aliases [2] , [34] and anonymous rendezvous [20] . This design goal is orthogonal to the motion-MIX design and thus is not studied in this paper.
At the network layer, wireless packets transmitted from a motion-MIX could be of different types: control packets or data packets. For example, the Internet Engineering Task Force standard Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [30] has the following network-layer packet types: route request (RREQ), route reply (RREP), route reply acknowledgment (RREP-ACK), route error (RERR), and DATA, where the initial four types are control flows. In anonymous routing, a major task is to design an anonymous control flow. It is important to note that two conditions must be satisfied with regard to the packet types.
1) Any two packets, including decoy packets, of the same packet type must be indistinguishable from each other. This requires the following: 1) All packets of the same type must be of the same length.
2) The type field and other similar common fields of the packet type must be identical in all packets of the type. 3) For flooding packets (e.g., RREQ in AODV), the fields prepared for the other end (source/destination) are identical in one flood round, but these fields must be computationally one time per flood. 4) All other fields are changed per hop. These fields must be computationally one time per hop, i.e., either (cryptographically strong) pseudorandom for real packets or truly random for decoy packets. 2) Any two packets of different types must be independent from the adversary's view. Control packets and data packets must not have correlation patterns that can be distinguished from truly random transmission events. For a motion-MIX, this requires the inside nodes to independently process each type of packets. That is, if there are m types of packet in the network, every node must independently run Algorithm A for each packet type.
At the MAC layer, IEEE 802.11b/a/g MAC layer frames use MAC addresses that must be anonymized, as previously described. It also uses acknowledgment (ACK)/request-tosend/clear-to-send control frames for reliable delivery and variable data rates with distances. Like AODV packet types, these packet types provide evidences for traffic analysis [21] . For motion-MIX, the per-packet-type treatment previously described also applies to the MAC layer. At the MAC layer, anonymity can be achieved by broadcasting all the frames to hide the real receiver. This appealing approach creates a reliability problem. An alternative approach is to use an anonymous MAC protocol that provides reliability [24] . Other strategies include those used in location privacy research, e.g., decoy traffic or random delay.
At the physical layer, an attacker may use more sophisticated equipment to capture different mobile nodes' radio signatures. Although the signal amplitude should not reveal anything more than a signal strength measurement, different nodes may use slightly different signal frequencies due to drifted clock implementations. Typically, an error of up to 25 ppm is tolerated in the standards. For example, at 2.4-GHz carrier frequency, a frequency offset of up to (2.4 × 10 9 × 2 × 25)/10 6 = 120 kHz would be tolerated. Consequently, within a motion-MIX, a radio device should add a deliberate and random frequency offset, so that two different nodes span over similar transmission frequency ranges [7] . Other wireless fingerprinting techniques are studied [13] , [17] , [18] , [32] , [39] , e.g., using a vector of RSSI measurements or probing the channel. Despite the fact that they are less practical as an attacking tool due to the requirement for dense deployment or active nature, physicallayer deliberations are necessary.
IV. NETWORK SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present an analysis on the security guarantee of motion-MIX in wireless ad hoc networks with an asymptotic security model.
A. Principle of Scalable Network Security
In modern cryptography, security is defined on the concept of "negligibility," which is asymptotically subpolynomial with respect to a predefined system parameter n. Intuitively, parameter n is the key length. When the system parameter n polynomially (e.g., linearly) increases, a quantity exponentially decreasing toward 0 is negligible. For example, once a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard encryption key is chosen, the probability of guessing the correct key is not 0 but at least 1/2 n , with n = 128, and is conjectured to be subpolynomial. Security can be achieved by linearly increasing key length n. We believe that this subpolynomial concept is also applicable to network security research. In all security analyses, we will show that the probability of security failure (which, in this paper, is the failure of mobile node MIXing together) exponentially decreases toward 0 when the corresponding network metrics linearly increase. In this paper, the network scale (i.e., the number of network members) N replaces key length n in cryptography. N becomes the critical system parameter in network security. As a result, in cryptography, the longer the key length, the more asymptotically secure the cryptosystem. In our analysis, the larger the network scale, the more asymptotically secure the network.
B. Security Guarantee of Motion-MIX
For a network deployed in a bounded system area, the location of a mobile node at an arbitrary time instant t can be modeled by a spatial Poisson point process with the average probability density function ρ 1 . ρ 1 can be obtained from related stochastic analysis and simulation, e.g., the results presented in [5] and [20] . Given this ρ 1 , we treat it as the arrival rate of a mobile node to each standing "position." For this study, we follow the stochastic mobility model, with the assumption of uniform spatial distribution in a venue quantified by Δ (and the analysis can easily be extended to the nonuniform case). Thus, the probability that there are exactly k nodes in a specific area Δ is
N is the number of nodes in the network. In addition, we adopt a probabilistic adversarial model. Among all the N network members, there are γ · N uncompromised nodes and (1 − γ) · N compromised nodes. Here, γ is the probabilistic network healthy ratio.
As shown in Fig. 3 , any wireless transmission is equally likely to be from any mobile transmitting nodes in the motion-MIX Δ , where Δ ≥ Δ + v avg · δt. That is, given an intercepted transmission at the current moment, the adversary cannot decide who is the transmitter among all the nodes in the enlarged area Δ . Given the security goals of k-anonymity and antitracing, we show that the failure probability follows the scalable network security model.
1) k-Anonymity:
The notion of k-anonymity says that the adversary is able to learn something about the sender or recipient of a particular message but cannot narrow down its search to a set of less than k participants. It is important to know that a motion-MIX ensures k-anonymity for all mobile nodes inside during a certain time Δt. In a motion-MIX of size Δ , the expectation of the number of targeting nodes E(k Δ ) is computable for the spatial Poisson point process:
Let us investigate the relation between k and E(k Δ ). The following analytic result will suggest that an appropriate k should be set to approximately
where k < N is the preselected system parameter per Δt and Δ = (Δ + v avg · δt) is the size of the least enlarged venue based on venue size Δ, the average node motion speed v avg , and the minimal delay between any two consecutive transmissions δt.
Proof (Sketch): A critical assumption in the proof is the publicity and finiteness of the anonymity sets AS id and AS venue . The adversary knows all the venues and all the possible identities (and, certainly, network scale N ). It can estimate network characteristics such as the distribution of mobile nodes.
The public and finite network area AS venue is partitioned into individual venues. For each venue quantified by Δ, the adversary expects that there are E(k Δ ) = Nγρ 1 · Δ possible identities that are capable of transmitting from the venue. Using a decoy traffic regulation algorithm (e.g., Algorithm A), the capable nodes will transmit at least k packets from the venue. (If multiple packet types are concerned, in Section III-D, we already stated that different packet types are separately regulated with independent k's.)
Due to the identity-free routing, one-time packet content, and physical radio deliberation requirements, any transmission is equally likely from any identity-free transmissions inside a motion-MIX. If k < E(k Δ ), then (E(k Δ ) − k) inside nodes do not win the chance to transmit decoy traffic. If k > E(k Δ ), then either some nodes inside the motion-MIX transmit more decoy traffic or some (k − E(k Δ )) previously silent nodes have roamed into the motion-MIX and just started their transmissions.
2) Assurance of k-Anonymity: Given the system requirement of k-anonymity, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The security failure probability of motion-MIX, i.e., the probability that there are less than k uncompromised nodes in the area quantified by Δ , is negligible with respect to network scale N .
Proof (Sketch):
The security failure probability is
Given a constant k, there are k items in (1), and each of them has a polynomial coefficient (Nγρ 1 · Δ ) i /i! but an exponentially decreasing e −Nγρ 1 ·Δ . Thus, P fail Δ is negligible with respect to N . In addition, we notice that, given venue Δ , there are, on average, m = E(k Δ )/γρ 1 · Δ number of nodes inside the venue. Thus, when N is less than m, the probability is a deterministic value. This observation does not violate the negligibility property, because, as long as Δ is given, the increase in N will lead to negligibility.
3) Untraceability: With motion-MIX, the untraceability is whether the adversary can trace any specific single node v. A successful tracing by an adversary is a collection of venues that are identified to belong to the same node v. The motion of v can be modeled as a stochastic process in a time epoch composing of a set of discrete time intervals T = (t 1 , t 2 , . . .) . The length of each time interval is a unit time Δt. 
Theorem 3:
The security failure probability of node tracing, i.e., the probability that the adversary can trace an active transmitting mobile node v's motion pattern without losing the target, is negligible with respect to N and |T |.
Proof (Sketch): Using our motion-MIX design, at least k transmissions occur per Δt if there is at least one node in the venue. The adversary's knowledge about the venue is one of two cases: 1) no node in the venue during Δt because there is no transmission and 2) some uncertain number of nodes in the venue. They transmit k indistinguishable messages during the interval. For tracing purposes, for a venue of size Δ, the adversary can successfully trace an active node if there is no other node in the corresponding venue of size Δ during the previous time interval Δt. Otherwise, it is equally likely (from the adversarial view) that the victim target stays there or keeps on moving to any neighboring venues. Therefore, the probability that the adversary can successfully trace a node v all the time is negligible with respect to N and |T |, i.e.,
C. Numerical Results
We illustrate the trends of the scalable security properties of the k-anonymity and the untraceability. According to mobility research, stochastic mobility models can reveal a nonuniform [5] or a uniform spatial distribution [4] (with a bounce-back or wraparound border of the system area). Here, we use the probability density function ρ 1 of the random waypoint mobility model [5] . According to the results presented in the papers, we set ρ 1 to be at a magnitude of 10 −6 and vary the size of the venue and the network scale. We set γ to be 0.9. Fig. 5 shows the failure property for various k-anonymity requirements (k = 5, 10, 15, 20, respectively). We select the transmission range to be 150 m. This value is the largest value that meets the need to reach the expected number of nodes inside the venue, i.e., 20. The figure shows the exponential decreasing trends for all the k values when the network scale increases. The close-to-1 probability comes from the observation that there is not enough nodes inside the venue when N is small. The decreasing trends are clear. Fig. 6 shows the curves with different transmission ranges for 10-anonymity. It is expected that there is a necessary number of nodes to guarantee k-anonymity in motion-MIX. As analyzed earlier, the necessary value of N is determined by the transmission ranges. The smaller probabilities when N is smaller come from the fact that there are not many nodes inside the motion-MIX. Fig. 7 shows the probability for an adversary to trace a target node under motion-MIX. As expected, the probabilities exponentially decease when the number of nodes linearly increases.
V. RELATED WORK
Existing anonymity schemes for wireless networks fall into a spectrum of classes. In "last-hop" wireless networks (including cellular networks and wireless local area networks), the demand of user roaming requires more promising assurance on the privacy of mobile users. The network participants considered in related research are typically the mobile user, the home server of the user, the foreign agent server local to the user, and the eavesdroppers, including the other users. In [2] , [19] , and [34] , mobile users are associated with dynamic aliases that appear unintelligible to anyone, except the home server. Then, the foreign agent server accepts the user's connections upon the home server's request. Hu and Wang [20] proposed the use of anonymous rendezvous, i.e., an anonymous bulletin board, to let mobile nodes anonymously connect to their communicators. These efforts provide unlinkability protections between node identities and their credentials during end-to-end anonymous transactions. This design goal is above the network layer and is orthogonal to the motion-MIX study.
In MANETs, the on-demand routing approach has been adopted by several recent designs to support anonymous connection. In ANODR [25] , the source creates an onion in the RREQ flood packet. Each forwarder adds a self-aware layer to the onion. Eventually, the destination receives an onion that can be used to deliver an RREP packet back to the source end, and an on-demand anonymous virtual circuit is established between the two ends. Protocols MASK [41] and ASRPAKE [27] use a pairing-based key predistribution and anonymous neighbor detection scheme prior to on-demand RREQ. This background operation reduces cryptographic processing overheads for the time-critical on-demand route-discovery process. MASK also creates anonymous virtual circuits using a routing procedure. Protocols SDAR [6] and AnonDSR [37] use an approach close to a MIX-net with on-demand route discovery. A neighbor detection protocol is devised to let each mobile node explicitly see its neighbors. After the on-demand route is established, data packets are delivered between the two ends using MIXnet onions. Source privacy is studied in [40] , which uses plain flooding to establish a secrete onion dada path. The multicast approach is introduced in [1] , where the packet-coding technique is used to combine multicast and onion routing. In these schemes, motion-MIX helps in mixing an ad hoc routing scheme's control and data packet flows. Currently, the control flows in these schemes do not implement Algorithm A (mostly due to performance concerns) and are thus traceable by a global timing analyst. As to data flows, SDAR is vulnerable to packet flow tracing. ANODR is not vulnerable, because it pays the cost of "neighborhood traffic mixing," which is a variant of Algorithm A. MASK employs a delay-tolerant approach, which is part of the motion-MIX design.
In wireless sensor networks, location privacy issues for the sources and sinks are studied in [10] and [29] . Both proposals seek to prevent the adversary from tracing network packet flows back to the sources or the sinks. The network presented is static, although the source and the sink can be mobile. Motion-MIX helps stop tracing by mixing packet flows together in a single motion-MIX en route.
In wireless location privacy, disposable addresses, MIX zones, and silent period are studied to decorrelate the changing pseudonyms of MAC addresses [3] , [16] , [22] to enhance location privacy with respect to time accuracy and position accuracy. The work of MIX zones focuses on static "geographic regions" with boundary lines. They protect user identities toward the upper layer, which do not tackle on-the-fly network, link layer identities, or radio signatures at the physical layer, as studied in the motion-MIX design. For location privacy in vehicular networks, the MIX zone concept has been studied at intersections where bounded areas provide the mixing [14] . Random silent periods are used to decorrelate consecutive pseudonyms [35] when vehicles broadcast safety messages.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that a mobile adversary can intercept control and data packets to launch various VPAs in mobile ad hoc wireless networks where routing services are essential for communications. Common routing and packetforwarding protocols are vulnerable to various VPAs. In this paper, mobile nodes can create and enlarge motion-MIXes to stop VPAs. Motion-MIXes dynamically create geographic regions and protect on-the-fly wireless transmissions. We have shown that identity-free routing, one-time packet content, and various protocol stack implementation concerns are necessary conditions to stop identity and traffic analysis attacks within a single motion-MIX. We have used an asymptotic network security model to study the anonymity protection provided in a motion-MIX, which shows that the network scale plays a role in proving negligible probability that an adversary can break motion-MIX's anonymity protection.
